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In a comment, hitherto unremarked upon, Alfred Binet, well known for constructing the
first intelligence scale, claimed that his scale did not measure intelligence, but only enabled
classification with respect to a hierarchy of intellectual qualities. Attempting to understand
the reasoning behind this comment leads to an historical excursion, beginning with the
ancient mathematician, Euclid and ending with the modern French philosopher, Henri
Bergson. As Euclid explained (Heath, 1908), magnitudes constituting a given quantitative
attribute are all of the same kind (i.e., homogeneous), but his criterion covered only exten-
sive magnitudes. Duns Scotus (Cross, 1998) included intensive magnitudes by considering
differences, which raised the possibility (later considered by Sutherland, 2004) of ordered
attributes with heterogeneous differences between degrees (“heterogeneous orders”).
Of necessity, such attributes are non-measurable. Subsequently, this became a basis for
the “quantity objection” to psychological measurement, as developed first by Tannery
(1875a,b) and then by Bergson (1889). It follows that for attributes investigated in science,
there are three structural possibilities: (1) classificatory attributes (with heterogeneous dif-
ferences between categories); (2) heterogeneous orders (with heterogeneous differences
between degrees); and (3) quantitative attributes (with thoroughly homogeneous differ-
ences between magnitudes). Measurement is possible only with attributes of kind (3) and,
as far as we know, psychological attributes are exclusively of kinds (1) or (2). However,
contrary to the known facts, psychometricians, for their own special reasons insist that
test scores provide measurements.
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This scale properly speaking does not permit the measure of
the intelligence, because intellectual qualities are not super-
posable, and therefore cannot be measured as linear surfaces
are measured, but are on the contrary, a classification, a hier-
archy among diverse intelligences; and for the necessities of
practice this classification is equivalent to a measure. (Binet
and Simon, 1980, pp. 40–41)
Anyone who knows what scientific measurement1 is, also knows
that psychometric testing is not measurement in the same sense
as that term is used in physical science to describe assessment of
quantitative attributes like distance, mass, or temperature. While
some psychometricians realize this, most do not and they typi-
cally regard tests as instruments of scientific measurement. Indeed,
some make a special point of stressing their credentials (for exam-
ple, Bond and Fox, 2007) for allegedly achieving measurement.
Also, it is not generally known that the attitude of ignoring the
logic of scientific measurement was present at the birth of psycho-
metrics. This attitude was not something that only emerged later in
the history of this discipline when its credentials were questioned.
From the very beginning there was a mindset that advocated only
one possibility: tests measure.
†Based on a paper read at the Rasch Measurement Conference, Perth, WA, Australia,
January 2012. I am grateful to participants of that conference and to referees of this
journal for critical feedback.
1For the concept of scientific measurement see Michell (1997, 2003, 2007).
There is a poignant vignette in the history of testing, one hith-
erto unexamined, which illustrates this point and, at the same
time, draws attention to an important, but long neglected con-
cept. This vignette involves the Frenchman, Alfred Binet2 and
the American, Lewis Terman3. As is well known, Binet (with
Simon) constructed the first “intelligence scale4,” which Terman
adapted for American use, eventually producing the “Stanford–
Binet scale5.” Less well known is that Binet6 thought this about
his test:
This scale properly speaking does not permit the measure of
the intelligence, because intellectual qualities are not super-
posable, and therefore cannot be measured as linear surfaces
are measured, but are on the contrary, a classification, a hier-
archy among diverse intelligences. (Binet and Simon, 1980,
p. 40)
When Terman read this he underlined the phrase, “a hierar-
chy among diverse intelligences,” and, venting incomprehension,
2Alfred Binet (1857–1911).
3Lewis Madison Terman (1877–1956).
4The BinetSimon scale was first published in 1905 and revised in 1908 and 1911.
5The first Stanford–Binet scale was produced in 1916 and went through numerous
revisions.
6Binet and Simon (1905). Wolf (1961) notes that this 1905 paper was actually writ-
ten solely by Binet, as were most of their nominally co-authored papers. Hence, I
refer to Binet as if the sole author.
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scribbled one word and a punctuation mark: “meaning7”? Despite
Binet’s phrase being pregnant with meaning, for Terman, this
meaning fell stillborn and, as an objection to testing, was never
raised again.
What did Binet mean by the remark, “intellectual qualities . . .
are a classification, a hierarchy among diverse intelligences”? That
this has gone undiscussed is odd given that the preceding remark,
viz.,“intellectual qualities are not superposable, and therefore can-
not be measured as linear surfaces are measured” has been noted
more than once (see for example Gould, 1981, p. 151; Nash, 1987,
p. 76; Michell, 1999, p. 94). At the time, measurement was thought
to depend upon equality between magnitudes, which in the case
of linear surfaces may be established by superposing, say, rigid
straight rods, thus identifying a set all equal to a given unit. This
allows the length of another object to be assessed by counting
equal units along its extent. So, this first part of Binet’s remark
raises the objection that measurement depends upon addition of
units, which in turn presupposes that the attribute involved pos-
sesses additive structure. I have already drawn attention to this
presupposition (see for example, Michell, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2009) so let me relate what Binet
meant by the second part of his remark.
Before Binet found fame, he was an experimental psycholo-
gist (see Wolf, 1973; Nicolas and Ferrand, 2002; for an account of
Binet’s research and difficulties). Much of his research was done as
director (without remuneration) of the laboratory of physiologi-
cal psychology at the Sorbonne, but Binet was repeatedly thwarted
in his attempts to gain a teaching position in psychology at that
university. Psychology was then seen as an area of philosophy and a
teaching position was denied him because he had no formal train-
ing in that discipline. Attempting to rectify this, he wrote articles
and a book on the mind-body problem (Binet, 1905), but all to
no avail. However, he was very well versed in philosophical issues
relevant to psychological research and, presumably, those relating
to the controversies then engulfing psychophysical measurement.
One of these was due initially to a French mathematician and
later expanded by a French philosopher (see Titchener, 1905; Hei-
delberger, 2004). The mathematician, Jules Tannery8, criticized
Fechner’s (1860) claim to have devised methods enabling mea-
surement of intensity of sensations. Fechner had been trained as
a physicist and when he said that he could measure sensations he
used the term “measure” in the same sense as it is used in quan-
titative physics. In physics, the measure of some magnitude is its
ratio to whatever unit is being employed and Tannery’s argument
was that sensation intensities are not measurable because they lack
the special kind of homogeneity necessary for measurement9. The
7The 1980 edition of an English translation of seminal papers by Binet and Simon,
from which the above passage is quoted, is a re-issue of a 1916 edition of the same
translation containing Terman’s marginalia.
8Jules Tannery (1848–1910). Tannery received his doctorate from the École Nor-
male Supérieur in 1874 and later was professor of mathematics there. His critique
of Fechner, made just after his graduation, is in Tannery (1875a,b) and reprinted in
Tannery (1912). No English translation is yet published. I am grateful to Christian
Bethmont for translating it for me.
9The epistemological realist would argue that sensations are not measurable because
there are no such things as sensations. There are physical quantities, such as temper-
ature and there are features of such quantities, such as order and ratio, that humans
magnitudes of any given quantitative attribute are all homoge-
neous. That is, as the magnitudes of some quantity, such as length,
increase by the repeated addition of the same unit, the meaning
of the unit does not alter. For example, one meter added to ten is
the same length as when added to one hundred. That is, any two
distinct lengths only ever differ quantitatively, never qualitatively.
This is part of what it means for length to be quantitative. However,
comparing, say, sensations of heat, Tannery claimed that we find,
as these sensations become more intense, they differ qualitatively
from one another, for example, at one extreme involving pain, at
the other not. Tannery’s point is that the sensation experienced is
not simply one of heat, but is a complex ensemble of various other
feelings as well, such as pain or pleasure, and it is the hierarchy
of these ensembles that, while ordered, contains qualitative dif-
ferences between degrees. Hence, while he agreed that sensations
within a given modality could be ordered according to intensity,
he thought that they could not be measured because the relevant
attribute (i.e., the series of sensations) possesses heterogeneous
differences between its degrees and, so, cannot be quantitative10.
Leaving aside whether he was right in his theory of sensations,
let us call any ordered attribute with heterogeneous differences
between its degrees, a heterogeneous order. Implicit in Tannery’s
objection is the claim that there are three different sorts of attrib-
utes in the world: classifications, such as, for example, the classi-
fication of people according to nationality; heterogeneous orders,
such as Tannery was claiming sensation intensities to be; and quan-
titative attributes, such as length, temperature, etc. As I will argue,
Tannery was right about this at least. Only quantitative attributes
can be measured because only they possess the necessary kind of
homogeneity. This is not to suggest, however, that classifications
and heterogeneous orders cannot be investigated scientifically,
only that when investigated, they must be assessed in other ways.
The philosopher, Henri Bergson11, while agreeing that sen-
sation intensities are not quantitative, muddied the waters by
insisting that if an attribute is ordered, if it admits relations of
“more” and “less,” then it must also be quantitative. He thought
that if the degrees of an attribute are ordered, this is only because
they stand in relations of inclusion to one another, greater degrees
always including all lesser. Because for him the model of inclu-
sion was spatial inclusion – a quantitative relation – he concluded
that order always entails quantity12. Consequently, he thought,
may or may not be sensitive to under various conditions, but there are no mental
entities, sensations, as both Fechner and Tannery believed. In this paper, however,
I am not concerned with this issue, but with the fact that his belief in sensations
was the vehicle whereby Tannery introduced the concept of a heterogeneous order.
So as not to deflect attention from this, my discussion maintains the fiction that
sensations exist.
10This argument is often referred to as the “quantity objection” to psychophysical
measurement. A similar, but better-known version of this objection was presented
later by von Kries (1882).
11Henri Bergson (1859–1941) was the most important French philosopher of the
first half of the twentieth century. An English translation of his critique of psy-
chophysics (Bergson, 1889) is given in Bergson (1913). Interestingly, it was Bergson
who was responsible for thwarting Binet’s career aspirations (Nicolas and Ferrand,
2002).
12The argument from order to quantity I call “the psychometricians’ fallacy”
(Michell, 2009, 2012) because (a) it is a demonstrable logical fallacy and (b) it
played a fundamental role in psychometrics.
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each sensation is a pure quality, neither greater nor less than any
other and all we can do with sensations is classify them. According
to Bergson (1889), the conviction that they are ordered is really
an illusion caused by extraneous accompaniments of the circum-
stances of their occurrence. For Bergson then, there are only two
kinds of attributes: classifications, and quantitative attributes13.
Although I have no direct evidence, I conclude that Binet was
aware of Bergson’s writings on psychophysics and since Bergson
refers to him, of Tannery’s as well. My reasons for this assessment
are as follows: psychophysics was then the most important area
of experimental psychology14 and, initially, “Binet’s goal was to
be recognized as the leader of experimental psychology in France”
(Nicolas and Ferrand, 2002, p. 265); Bergson’s critique of psy-
chophysics was well known in France and is said to be the main
reason why experimental psychology got off to such a slow start
there (Nicolas and Murray, 1999); and, furthermore, Binet was
well aware of Bergson and his work, having referred to Bergson in
other writings15.
Interpreted in this light, Binet’s remark may be understood
as drawing upon both Tannery and Bergson. Of course, Binet
was not, like Tannery and Bergson, discussing sensation intensi-
ties but was discussing the cognitive states sustaining performance
on intellectual tasks: “intellectual qualities,” as he called them. At
first, Binet, like Bergson, seemed to recognize only two possibil-
ities: classification and measurement, with intellectual qualities
only amenable to the former. Consistent with this, in an earlier
paper (Binet, 1898), he had suggested that higher mental func-
tions, like “acuteness of intelligence” could only be classified, not
measured, again making his point as if these were the only two
possibilities16. But then he added that intellectual qualities form
a hierarchy – that is, an order – among diverse intelligences. Now,
had he been following Bergson’s line, he would have concluded
either that intellectual qualities are measurable (because Berg-
son thought that order entails quantity) or that the ordering of
intellectual qualities that his scale achieved was illusory, which he
clearly did not believe. It is clear from the discussion that follows
that Binet thought that ordered degrees of intelligence were real
and could be assessed. Hence, I conclude that he did not follow
Bergson’s line. As the phrase “diverse intelligences” indicates, he
seems to have thought that the reason intelligence cannot be mea-
sured is because the cognitive states underlying test performance
are not quantitatively homogeneous, but differ from one another
in heterogeneous ways. Thus, they constitute what I am calling a
heterogeneous order. It is this “diversity,” this heterogeneity, which
Binet thought rules out measurement.
But why was it thought that heterogeneity rules out measure-
ment? It is because measurement of quantitative attributes requires
that they possess the special property of quantitative homogeneity.
13This was the position later adopted in psychometrics, where it is held that attrib-
utes are either categories or continua, e.g., Cronbach and Meehl (1955), Loevinger
(1957), Meehl (1992), and De Boeck et al. (2005). Bergson should be recognized as
the “patron sage” of psychometrics.
14For example, note the place it occupies in Titchener (1905).
15For example, in his book on the mind-body problem, Binet (1905) criticized Berg-
son extensively. Binet appears not to have thought too highly of the man standing
in his way.
16This paper is discussed in Carroy and Plas (1996).
Around 300 BC, Euclid, compiled his Elements. Book V touched on
the topic of measurement (see Heath, 1908). Euclid noted that the
magnitudes17 of any given quantitative attribute, such as length,
are magnitudes of the same kind, that is, homogeneous. For example,
all lengths, say, the length of this room and the length of your shoe,
are magnitudes of the same kind. And we can tell this, thought
Euclid18, because if we take any length, like the length of your shoe,
and multiply it some finite number of times, it will exceed any other
length, like, say, the length of this room. This tells us that these two
lengths are homogeneous because it means that the length of this
room falls between two lengths in the series of multiples of your
shoe length. This series must be homogeneous because it contains
multiples of exactly the same length, viz., length of your shoe, and,
so, if the length of this room can fall between items within this
series, it must be homogeneous with the lengths constituting it.
Now, this criterion of homogeneity is fine, but limited. It
works with extensive attributes, that is, quantitative attributes like
length, where multiples can be constructed, but it does not work
with intensive attributes, like temperature. This did not matter in
ancient times because then only extensive attributes were mea-
sured, like length, area, volume, plane angle, weight, and time.
Ancient philosophers, like Plato19 and Aristotle20 could only spec-
ulate that other attributes, like say, pleasure, or temperature might
be quantitative.
Of course, it did not require measurement of intensive attrib-
utes to wonder about their homogeneity. From the thirteenth
century, scholars became intrigued by the fact that certain quali-
ties, like charity or whiteness, occur in different degrees21, and that
these degrees are subject to change. That is, one person might pos-
sess less charity than a second 1 day, but later, the first might come
to have more charity than the second; or one shirt might be whiter
than another 1 day, but not as white the next. The puzzle was how
to think about different degrees of a given quality and how to con-
ceptualize change from one degree to another (see Crombie, 1994).
There are only two possibilities. I call them the qualitative and
the quantitative. On the qualitative view, each distinct degree of a
quality, such as whiteness, is qualitatively different from the rest.
So what we would have with the range of shades we call degrees of
whiteness would be a series of discrete grades approaching pure
whiteness, but each differing from the other in some qualitative
way, say, due to the presence of some different kind of impurity
mixed in with the white. By contrast, on the quantitative view, each
different degree of some quality is quantitatively different to each
other, so that what we have with a quality such as whiteness would
be a continuous series of shades approaching pure whiteness.
This problem was made the harder because medieval philoso-
phers revered Aristotle who taught that qualities and quantities
17Usage is not completely standard in this context. I use the term “magnitude” to
refer to specific instances of a quantitative attribute, such as length. Thus, the length
of my shoe, which may be, say, 30 cm, is a magnitude of length.
18Or at least this was De Morgan (1836) interpretation of him.
19See Plato’s (1993) Philebus.
20See Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption (McKeon, 1941).
21The idea of “degrees of a quality” should not be confused with the concept of
“degree” as it occurs in, say, the measurement of angle or temperature. In the former,
the term “degree” implies nothing more than order, while in the latter it designates
a unit of measurement.
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are different categories of existence and that they exclude one
another. In particular, Aristotle had taught both that “Quantity
does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree22” and “Qual-
ities admit variation of degree23.” What Aristotle meant is that
there are no degrees of any quantitative attribute, such as being
four feet in length: an object either is or it is not four feet. On the
other hand, qualities, such as being white, admit degrees. That is,
one thing may be whiter than another. Furthermore, it was widely
believed, especially in the early middle ages, that qualities were
more important than quantities in understanding how the physical
world worked (Crombie, 1994). So, medieval philosophers initially
endorsed the qualitative option. However, the British philosopher,
John Duns Scotus24, convinced them that the quantitative option
was superior, especially for explaining change. As Richard Cross
explains Scotus’ position: for any quality, Q, “a change from one
degree D to another E is explained by the addition and subtrac-
tion of (homogeneous) parts of Q” (Cross, 1998, p. 186). When
Scotus’ solution caught on, the momentum of the ensuing con-
ceptual revolution was unstoppable. From the fourteenth century,
philosophers conceptualized all degrees of qualities as if measur-
able quantities (see for example Pedersen, 1974; Lindberg, 1992;
Grant, 1996). As expressed by the medieval French scholar, Nicole
Oresme, “the measure of intensities (of qualities) can be fittingly
imagined as the measure of lines” (Clagget, 1968, p. 167). From
then onward, this conceptualization of qualities became a per-
manent feature of scientific thought and it became axiomatic in
psychology from the second half of the nineteenth century. It is
echoed in slogans such as Thorndike’s credo, which still reverber-
ates through the discipline (Michell, 2005): “Whatever exists at all
exists in some amount. To know it thoroughly involves knowing
its quantity as well as its quality” (Thorndike, 1918, p. 16).
How did those following Scotus understand quantitative
homogeneity in relation to the degrees constituting a specific qual-
ity? His treatment forced them to focus upon differences between
degrees. If degrees of some quality are quantitative, then differ-
ences between degrees, also, must only differ quantitatively, not
qualitatively. This defines quantitative homogeneity: not only are
all magnitudes of a given quantity magnitudes of the same kind;
and not only are differences between all pairs of magnitudes like-
wise of the same kind; but also, and this is the crucial point,
these differences cannot differ from one another in any qualitative
way. Different magnitudes of the same quantitative attribute never
differ qualitatively.
This position does not rule out the possibility that objects
possessing different degrees of some attribute might differ quali-
tatively from one another. For example, as temperature increases,
ice turns to water, which in turn turns to steam and these dif-
ferent states of water differ qualitatively. But this does not mean
that temperature differences likewise differ qualitatively. Objects
must be distinguished from attributes and whether any substance
is solid, liquid, or gas depends upon other properties it possesses,
not just upon its temperature, as is clear from the fact that different
22Categories, 6a 19 (McKeon, 1941, p. 17).
23Categories, 10b 26 (McKeon, 1941, p. 27).
24John Duns Scotus (1266–1308). For a discussion of Duns Scotus’ suggestion, see
Cross (1998).
substances liquefy or vaporize at quite different temperatures.
However, the quantitative attribute of temperature, itself, which
is now understood in physics as a property of a body’s internal
energy, is such that differences between its magnitudes never differ
qualitatively.
Conversely, the degrees of a mere quality, if such exist, would
differ from one another only qualitatively. The degrees of such
a quality would still all be homogeneous, in the sense that they
would all be degrees of the same quality, and differences between
the degrees would also be homogeneous in the sense that they
would all be differences between degrees of the same quality. How-
ever, these differences between degrees would also be qualitatively
different and, hence, heterogeneous. This may sound contradic-
tory, but it is not. We encounter collections of things that are both
homogeneous and heterogeneous. For example, a collection of
people is always homogeneous in the sense that it is a collection of
people. However, it may also be heterogeneous in the sense that it
may contain people of different kinds, say, males, and females.
The important distinction here is between collections that are
thoroughly homogeneous, such as the magnitudes of a quantity
and collections that are both homogeneous and heterogeneous,
such as degrees of a quality. Quantitative homogeneity is pure.
Non-quantitative homogeneity is impure.
So we can see that from a logical point of view, Tannery was
right, three different kinds of attributes are possible: classifications,
where there will be heterogeneous differences between classes, but
the classes are not ordered; heterogeneous orders, which admit qual-
itative differences between degrees and, so, the degrees are not
measurable; and quantitative attributes, which admit no hetero-
geneity in differences between magnitudes and, so, are measurable.
Heterogeneous orders might be logically possible, but do they
ever actually exist? The medieval philosophers never asked this, so
seduced were they by the perceived merits of Scotus’ suggestion.
Their neglect had one positive outcome: an intellectual climate
conducive to the Scientific Revolution, in so far as attempts to
measure intensive quantitative attributes, like velocity, density,
and temperature were concerned. But, it also had a negative side:
false expectations regarding ordered attributes generally, for it
was presumed that in principle, every ordered attribute must be
measurable.
A priori, this is highly implausible. There are indefinitely many
concepts to which we apply degree words (see Bolinger, 1972;
Engel, 1989): for example, arguments may be more or less rigorous;
procedures, more or less efficient; sketches, more or less life-like;
songs, more or less romantic; prisons, more or less secure; and so
on. Is it safe to conclude, without further ado, that in each such
case, the relevant ordered attribute is quantitative and, therefore,
in principle measurable? If we were to look closely at, say, different
degrees of security in prisons, might we not find that it is qualita-
tively different factors that constitute increasing levels of security?
At least, we cannot rule out this possibility a priori.
Over the centuries, a range of views emerged, with, at one
extreme, some, like Thomas Reid, berating Francis Hutcheson, for
“applying measures to things that properly have not quantity25”
25Reid (1748/1849, p. 717). Reid was attacking Hutcheson’s (1725) proposed moral
algebra.
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and, at the other extreme, others, such as Thorndike chanting
his credo. Reid assumed what Thorndike denied, that not every
ordered attribute is quantitative. Few showed Reid’s perspicac-
ity and most followed the quantitative path, although some, such
as the philosopher, Curt Ducasse, moderated it by claiming that
“the non-measurability of something that observably admits of
more and less is never known to be an intrinsic character of it26.”
However, this latter view leaves the gate to the quantitative path
perpetually ajar, by denying that non-measurability could be an
intrinsic characteristic of ordered attributes. It means that the issue
can only ever be decided in one direction (i.e., by establishing that
an attribute is quantitative) and never in the other (i.e., it cannot
be established that an ordered attribute is not quantitative). Were
this the case, psychometricians could build their quantitative cas-
tles in the air, safe in the conviction that they can never be shown
to be wrong because, on this view, one can never validly conclude
that an ordered attribute is non-quantitative.
However, Reid is right and, as a matter of fact, the German
philosopher, Immanuel Kant, settled the matter otherwise over
a century before psychometrics was born, but his discussion is
still not well known in psychology, at least27. Kant noted that
within a series of concepts ordered according to specificity (such
as, for example, the concepts of human, primate, mammal, verte-
brate, animal), the differences between succeeding concepts, while
homogeneous (i.e., they are all differences between living things)
are also heterogeneous (i.e., e.g., what distinguishes humans from
the rest of the primates is not the same kind of thing as distin-
guishes primates from other mammals, and so on). This shows
that some hierarchies are heterogeneous orders28.
Furthermore, Kant showed why heterogeneity rules out mea-
surability. For example, the concept of being a human includes
that of being a primate, that of being a primate includes that of
being a mammal, and so on. It is the relation of conceptual inclu-
sion that is the basis for order in this case. However, consider the
difference between humans and other primates and the difference
between primates and other mammals. No such relation of inclu-
sion exists between these differences and, so, they are intrinsically
unordered. But if an order is to be quantitative, then differences
between its degrees must be intrinsically ordered29. Ducasse was
wrong: an ordered attribute is intrinsically non-measurable if the
differences between its degrees are heterogeneous because then
such differences are not equal to, greater than, or less than one
another. Thus, non-measurability can be an intrinsic feature of an
ordered attribute.
Those who nonetheless still insist, albeit wrong-headedly, that
every ordered attribute is quantitative confuse differences between
degrees of an ordered attribute with quantitative distances between
magnitudes of a quantitative attribute. The British philosopher,
26Ducasse (1941, p. 42). Ducasse was criticizing Collingwood’s (1933) concept of a
“scale of forms,” which was that of a heterogeneous order by another name.
27See Sutherland’s (2004) discussion of Kant’s views.
28Binet’s book on the mind/body problem paid attention to Kant’s views (Binet,
1905), but whether he knew of Kant’s views on the philosophy of measurement I do
not know.
29See Hölder (1901) and Krantz et al. (1971). Krantz et al. show that an attribute’s
being quantitative is equivalent to a special kind of ordering upon the differences
between magnitudes.
David Hume, warned, “any great difference in the degrees of any
quality is called a distance by a common metaphor” because “the
ideas of distance and difference are . . . connected together” and
“connected ideas are readily taken for each other” (Hume, 1888,
p. 393). In other words, Hume was saying, this confusion comes
about because of a cognitive illusion, viz., taking distance as a
metaphor for difference. Psychologists have applied all of their
ingenuity to the finding of ways whereby this illusion might be
exploited. For example, psychometricians who favor item response
theory (IRT) models do this by presuming certain responses to test
items to be “errors” and then treating features of these “errors” as
an index of the magnitude of the distances that they believe exist
between degrees of ability. However, without that presumption, it
is not clear that these putative distances are any more than quali-
tative differences and that psychometricians are merely exploiting
the illusion Hume drew attention to.
While Kant showed that heterogeneous orders exist and
revealed why they cannot be quantitative, he did not bring out
the scientific importance of the distinction between quantitative
attributes and heterogeneous orders. Quantitative attributes stand
in regular quantitative relationships with one another, such as,
area= length× breadth. This is made possible by the pure homo-
geneity of their magnitudes. For example, because there is no
qualitative difference between different lengths, the relationship
between length and other attributes, such as area, does not vary
across the range of lengths. However, because the degrees of a het-
erogeneous order differ qualitatively from one another, different
causal laws will apply to different degrees of the same attribute.
Any science dealing with heterogeneous orders will be much more
complex than quantitative sciences, such as physics. Attempting
to quantify heterogeneous orders treats them in a way that belies
their complexity and, thereby, falsifies our understanding of them.
This is the background to Binet’s remark that the attributes
underlying test performance are not measurable, but are hier-
archies among diverse intelligences. Was he right? Consider, for
example, any unidimensional test of ability – say, a test of math-
ematical ability. It consists of a series of test items of increasing
difficulty such that at each level of difficulty, the cognitive resources
required to pass an item differ from those above or below it in
qualitatively different ways. That is, if three items, x, y, and z are
unidimensional (that is, all assess the same ability) and of increas-
ing difficulty, then the difference between x and y in terms of
cognitive resources required for a correct response cannot be the
same as those between y and z, and so on for all such pairs. Hence,
the attribute assessed by the test, which is, of course, the series of
cognitive states determining different levels of test performance,
is a hierarchy with heterogeneous differences between degrees. As
such it is intrinsically non-quantitative. That is, Binet was right
about mental abilities, in so far as their character can be inferred
from the test items used in assessment: they are non-measurable
attributes.
In the most clear cut case, the cognitive resources needed to
pass an item at any level of difficulty subsume those needed to
pass all easier items. That is, the cognitive resources constituting
any degree of ability stand in relations of inclusion to all lesser
degrees. Disregarding performance errors, this kind of structure
in degrees of ability would sustain a Guttman scale and no doubt,
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given performance errors, it could produce response patterns fit-
ting quantitative psychometric models, such as IRT models. That
is, it is possible that attributes that psychometricians aspire to mea-
sure are heterogeneous orders, that is, non-measurable attributes,
and this fact is not incompatible with observing statistical fit to
IRT models30.
So, what does this tale from the archives reveal? Twenty-two
years ago, discussing measurement in psychology, I wrote, “The
mistake of the psychologists was to be more interested in the
pursuit of their quantitative program than in the pursuit of the
underlying facts” (Michell, 1990, p. 20). This tale reveals that the
pursuit of a quantitative program in preference to investigation
of the facts can be dated from the birth of psychometrics. This
tale describes the moment when the original presumption was
made that tainted everything after it. From here on, the history of
psychometrics became the history of rationalizations for measure-
ment: probabilistic, quantitative IRT models being the latest. These
models contain a common feature: they presume that the attrib-
utes tests assess are all continuous, quantitative attributes. There
is no evidence, independent of these models, however, supporting
this presumption. Indeed, in so far as the attribute assessed by any
test is constituted by the hierarchy of cognitive states sufficient
for correct responses to its items, it is a heterogeneous order, not
a quantitative structure. Binet, more than a century ago, alluded
to this difficulty. Not only did an uncomprehending Terman turn
away, but also interestingly, Binet, himself, commented that “for
the necessities of practice” the classification that his test provided
“is equivalent to a measure” (Binet and Simon, 1980, pp. 40–41).
In the same collection, in a paper on the 1908 version of his
scale (Binet and Simon, 1908), Binet is translated as saying,
“The Measurement of Intelligence” is, perhaps the most oft
repeated expression in psychology during these last few years.
Some psychologists affirm that intelligence can be measured;
others declare that it is impossible to measure intelligence.
But there are still others, better informed, who ignore these
theoretical discussions and apply themselves to the actual
solving of the problem. (Binet and Simon, 1980, p. 182)
What are we to make of Binet’s apparent equivocation about
whether his scale provides a measure of intelligence? He knew
that his scale did not measure intelligence and yet thought that for
practical purposes it was equivalent to a measure. On this basis,
Nash (1987) accuses him of “intellectual bad faith” but I think that
another interpretation is more likely: in drawing our attention to
the distinction, I believe Binet was merely cocking his snoot at his
bête noire, Henri Bergson. Bergson did not think that psychophys-
ical measurement was possible and, as Binet realized, Bergson’s
argument applies with equal force to Binet’s intelligence scale.
As far as Binet was concerned, however, this purely philosoph-
ical objection had no value alongside the practical achievement
wrought by his intelligence scale because his scale, he thought,
enables us to do all that we could ask of an actual measurement
30For example, Black et al. (2011), Commons et al. (2008), Kyngdon (2006), and
Kyngdon and Richards (2007) all present tests in which the only discernable struc-
ture manifest in the item sets is ordinal and yet IRT models fit the relevant data. I
thank Andrew Kyngdon for drawing my attention to the first two of these references.
device, were we in possession of one. Hence, he seems to have
thought, let us be done with it and call it equivalent to a mea-
sure of intelligence. Binet’s career aspirations had been cruelled by
Bergson on the grounds that Binet was philosophically unqualified
to be a professor of psychology. So both Binet and his scale were
in the same boat: philosophically unqualified. But just as Binet
thought his scale could do all that might be asked of it without
those qualifications, so he clearly thought he also was worthy of
the position denied him.
Even today, it remains true that most of the practical decisions
made on the basis of psychological test scores ask nothing more
than that those scores order people on the attributes assessed.
So, to that extent, Binet was correct. However, to take the fur-
ther step, and assert that such scores are equivalent to a measure,
is to license exactly the sort of confused thinking that character-
izes modern psychology. Less than a decade later, an advocate of
Binet’s tests, Margaret Drummond wrote, “The ideal that Binet
set himself was the formation of a scale which should measure
intelligence in something the same way as the foot-rule measures
height” (Drummond, 1914, p. 147). This confusion was all grist
to the psychologists’ mill as they sought to project the image of
their discipline as a quantitative science and to market their tests
as instruments of scientific measurement.
However, it might be asked, what difference would it make if, as
I have argued, the kinds of attributes psychometricians aspire to
measure are not quantitative? After all, they could still be assessed
with respect to order and is there such a huge difference between
ordinal and interval scales? One of the defects of Stevens’s well
known classification of “scales of measurement” (Stevens, 1946)
is that in assimilating classifications (“nominal scales” in Stevens’s
terms) and orderings (“ordinal scales”) into his concept of mea-
surement, the conceptual difference between the qualitative meth-
ods of classifying and ordering and the quantitative method of
measurement is obscured. The simplest way to see this difference
is to note the fact that in “nominal” and “ordinal scaling” the use
of numerals is optional because all of the information contained
in such “scales” can be expressed non-numerically. For example,
the classes comprising a classification can be given non-numerical
names and the categories constituting an ordering can be des-
ignated using terms from any ordered series, such as letters of
the alphabet. On the other hand, in “interval” and “ratio” scaling,
number is necessarily implicated because the information such
scales contain is intrinsically numerical. This is why measurement
is a quantitative method and classification and ordering are not
quantitative but merely qualitative methods. Noting this, further
differences would follow for the context of psychological testing
were the relevant psychological attributes heterogeneous orders.
First, it would mean that the phenomena of intelligence, abil-
ities, personality traits, and social attitudes are not quantitative
phenomena and, thus, modeling psychometrics upon quantita-
tive physics, as done since Spearman (1904) would be a false lead.
Scientific progress requires conceptualizing relevant phenomena
correctly. Were abilities, for example, heterogeneous orders, con-
ceptualizing them as purely homogeneous attributes would blind
investigators to distinctions between the degrees of any given
ability and, so, the character of such attributes would be misun-
derstood. Just as understanding the workings of the human body
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requires first getting anatomical structures right, so understand-
ing the workings of the human mind depends upon first getting
psychological structures right.
Second, it would mean that the features of people assessed by
psychological tests are best described, not numerically but qualita-
tively via a specification of, say, the knowledge, skills, and strategies
displayed in getting ability test items correct. That is, for example,
in testing mathematical ability, the optimal form for describing a
person’s performance is not numerical (say, person X got 20 out of
30 correct answers or X ’s ability “measure” is 7.5) but something
like X knows this or that mathematical fact, or X can perform this
or that operation or X can employ this or that solution strategy.
In science, description needs to fit the structure of the attrib-
utes described and if abilities, etc., are heterogeneous orders, then
qualitative description will be less misleading than quantitative.
Third, because the different degrees of any ability, say, would
be qualitatively different, it would mean that people possessing
different degrees would be subject to different causal laws. Then,
for example, the kind of intervention that improves ability at one
degree would not necessarily improve ability at other degrees. As
already indicated, in quantitative sciences like physics, the lack of
heterogeneity within each and every quantitative attribute sustains
the system of homogeneous quantitative interrelationships that
exist, such as force equals mass times acceleration. No such pat-
tern of homogeneous laws could exist where the relevant attributes
are not quantitative. If psychological attributes are heterogeneous
orders, psychology will lack the simplicity characterizing quantita-
tive physics. It will be a much more richly textured science, one in
which the density of causal relationships will constantly challenge
our cognitive capacities.
Fourth, if abilities, etc., are heterogeneous orders then it fol-
lows that psychometricians have misconstrued the problem of test
validity. The concept of test validity is generally understood via
the concept of “construct validity” (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955).
The “construct” that a test is thought to “measure” is conceived as
a theoretical, psychological, quantitative attribute of persons and,
therefore, an attribute that is purely homogeneous, with no hetero-
geneous differences between degrees. However, it is significant that
after 60 years, psychometricians have not yet managed to define a
single psychological construct in terms of intrinsic characteris-
tics. Constructs are generally defined as dispositional concepts by
reference to the behaviors that are thought to cause, such as mathe-
matical ability, which causes mathematical behavior; verbal ability,
which causes verbal behavior, and so on. Furthermore, it is not
made clear how a purely homogeneous attribute could sustain the
heterogeneous differences between the cognitive states necessary
for correct responses. On the other hand, if abilities are hetero-
geneous orders, there would be no longer any mystery about the
character of the attribute assessed nor any mystery about how such
an attribute produces correct responses (Michell, in press). In this
case, what any ability item assesses would be just the knowledge,
skills, and strategies required to get it correct, a cognitive state
implied by the content of the item itself. That is, the issue of test
validity would be exposed as an artifact of attempting to construe
abilities as theoretical quantitative attributes. While intelligence or
general ability is often thought of as a cognitive factor present to
some degree in all intellectual tasks (such as Spearman’s “educa-
tion of correlates”; Spearman, 1923, p. 284), no one knows whether
there is any general property of our cognitive processes that con-
tributes to individual differences in performance on all intellectual
tasks and if the attribute assessed by any test is a heterogeneous
order then there is no reason at this stage to conclude that any
candidate for general ability must be quantitative in structure.
Fifthly, the fact that psychometricians, from the founding of
their discipline, studiously turned away from investigating whether
the attributes they aspired to measure really are quantitative means
that their discipline is a pathological science (Michell, 2000) and
that their standing as scientists is deeply compromised. Scientists
who care more about appearing to be quantitative and the advan-
tages that might accrue from that appearance, than they do about
investigating fundamental scientific issues, put expedience before
the truth. In this, they do not conform to the values of science and
elevate non-scientific interests over those values, thereby threat-
ening to bring science as a whole into disrepute. If the attributes
that psychometricians aspire to measure are heterogeneous orders
then psychometrics, as it exists at present, is fatally flawed and des-
tined to join astrology, alchemy, and phrenology in the dustbin of
history.
While this paper has been concerned primarily with histor-
ical issues, the matters discussed are not just historical. Raking
over the coals of this episode, I have resurrected the concept of
a heterogeneous order. Now, psychometricians have no excuse
not to reconsider the structure of the attributes, which, hitherto,
they concluded were quantitative. Considering the quotation from
Binet and Simon with which this paper began, it could be argued
that, properly understood, it says all that any non-psychometrician
needs to know about psychological testing: testing may not be
measurement, in the scientific sense, because the psychological
states subtending performance on tests may not be quantitatively
structured; such states might form merely ordered hierarchies of
abilities, etc., characterized by heterogeneous differences between
their degrees; but for all of the practical purposes to which test
scores are currently put, since only ordinal information is used,
it serves as well as actual measurements would, were they possi-
ble. But rather than follow Binet in therefore calling test scores
“measurements,” it would be sufficient for all scientific purposes
to call them merely “assessments” and we must look for other,
non-scientific reasons should we wish to understand why psycho-
metricians have not always adopted this more modest, accurate
appellation. As for measurement, the burden of proof now lies with
psychometricians for even with the best of tests the default position
now is that the attributes assessed are merely heterogeneous orders.
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